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I. INTRODUCTION
Across boardrooms, academia, governments and the media,
executive compensation is being discussed with increased regular-
ity. Today, executive compensation is regarded as a "hot topic" in
both the legal and business communities. For the most part, the
issue of corporate governance has only recently focused on execu-
tive compensation.1 In addition, the recent focus of executive com-
pensation has primarily "been on the total dollar value of
* J.D. Candidate 2008, Gouzaga University; B.A. 2005, Washington State
University. 2007 SEC Summer Honors Legal Program - Division of Corporate
Finance, Office of International Corporate Finance.
1. INST. OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS., ICD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON THE
GOVERNANCE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN CANADA, at iii (Jun. 2007) [hereinafter
ICD REPORT] available at http://www.icd.ca/scriptcontent/blueRibbonDownload.cfm?
section=News (free registration required).
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executive compensation packages as opposed to the crucial gov-
ernance-related function that compensation plays within an
organization."2 When compared to the U.S., however, the execu-
tive compensation levels in Canada are significantly less.' During
the early 1990s compensation for most of Canada's top executives
was about 50% of the American average.4  As a result,
"[c]ompensation levels in Canada have not generated the same
amount of attention as they have in the United States."5
Despite the difference in compensation levels, Canada is
actively scrutinizing its current executive compensation laws.
Following corporate scandals in both Canada and the U.S., many
people are calling for an overhaul of Canada's regulatory scheme,
especially in the area of executive compensation. While total com-
pensation remains the primary focus, many actors are concerned
about "the role of executive compensation as a governance mecha-
nism .... 6
Executive compensation packages are supposed to align the
corporate officer's interest with the interest of the company and
its shareholders.7 If utilized correctly, compensation packages can
be an effective tool for regulating corporate governance. Any regu-
lation of corporate governance, however, must be well-informed
and clearly structured. When the U.S. overhauled its regulation
of executive compensation in the early 1990s companies simply
adapted their packages to include more incentive-based compen-
sation, which allowed them to avoid the intended purpose of the
new regulations.' The end result is the current proliferation of
options backdating scandals.
This article comments on Canada's current discussion of exec-
utive compensation laws and regulations. Part II provides a gen-
eral discussion of the relationship between executive
2. Id.
3. Benjamin Alarie, Executive Compensations and Tax Policy: Lessons for
Canada from the Experience of the United States in the 1990s, 61 U. TORONTO FAC. L
REV. 39, 44 (2003).
4. Xianming Zhou, Executive Compensation and Managerial Incentives: A
Comparison Between Canada and the United States, 5 J. OF CORP. FIN. 277, 300
(1999) cited in Alarie, supra note 3, at 44.
5. ICD REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. Canadian compensation packages are smaller
for a number of reasons, including a smaller average firm size, emphasis on salary,
cultural influences, and competitiveness of markets.
6. Id. at 7.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 8-9. The new regulations were supposed to make it more difficult for
large companies to pay executives enormous salaries.
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compensation and corporate scandal. With the background set,
Part III presents the current executive compensation laws and
regulations in Canada. Part IV looks at Canada's current plans to
overhaul its executive compensation. In Part V, I introduce the
current U.S. and European approaches to executive compensation
regulation. Finally, Part VI discusses the direction that Canada
should proceed in light of the various approaches.
II. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND CORPORATE SCANDAL
Corporate fraud can be viewed from an economic perspective,
where the costs of the fraud (i.e. the severity of the punishment,
both criminal and civil, and the likelihood of being caught) are bal-
anced against the benefits (i.e. the potential financial pay-off).9
While the cost-benefit analysis cannot be applied across the board
and its application depends on the ethical foundation of each indi-
vidual executive, it can be used in a broad regulatory sense.1" Not
surprisingly, recent studies have found that corporate executives
who commit fraud have "financial incentives that are 69% greater
than" the average compensation package." Most of these incen-
tives constitute large, unrestricted stock and option holdings,
which "are 115% larger than comparable incentives for the
median control executive."12
Incentives or pay-outs are not the only benefits that may com-
pel an executive to commit corporate fraud. Quantity of opportu-
nity may supersede the quality of the incentive.'3 While security
regulators can reduce the incentive by increasing the penalties,
reducing the opportunities may be a more effective means of
preventing corporate fraud. Reducing corporate fraud through
increased disclosure and transparency of executive compensation
9. See Shane A. Johnson, Harley E. Ryan, Jr, & Yisong S. Tian, Executive
Compensation and Corporate Fraud 1 (July 23, 2003) (unpublished draft, available at
http://www.wlu.ca/documents/10886/tian.pdf) (referring to "Becker's (1968) economic
theory of crime framework.. ."). A similar paper by the same authors has since been
published under a different title, as Shane A. Johnson, Harley E. Ryan and Yisong S.
Tian Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: the Sources of Incentives Matter
(EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=395960.
10. See Johnson et al., supra note 9, at 1 n.1 (stating that increased incentives
may entice more executives to corporate fraud).
11. Id. at 2 (the study used "firms that are the subjects of the Securities and
Exchange Commission's (SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases
(AAERs)... ." While the numbers do not reflect data from Canadian firms, I assume
that the similarity and closeness of the two markets produce similar data).
12. Id.
13. See id. (noting that executives may commit greater fraud simply because there
is greater opportunity).
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is more effective for a number of reasons. First, heightened disclo-
sure requirements allow stockholders to perform the role of over-
seer. Second, covering up frauds will be much more difficult, i.e.,
with more transparency a potential fraud will be increasingly dif-
ficult to hide. Finally, many civil penalties that arise out of execu-
tive fraud are paid for by the corporation and therefore, the
shareholders. Efficient regulation should target the individuals
responsible for the fraud and use an effective balance of individu-
alized civil and criminal penalties.
Ultimately, the more difficult it is for shareholders and
boards of directors to monitor corporate executives, the more they
must align the executive's interest with their own.14 This in turn
creates greater incentives for would-be defrauders,"s but if these
incentives are disclosed - along with other areas of corporate gov-
ernance - the fraud will be more difficult to cover-up. The end
result is that shareholders and boards of directors can provide
executives with large incentives, while reducing the opportunity
to commit fraud.
There are two primary approaches to controlling corporate
fraud through executive compensation: "the optimal contracting
approach and the managerial power approach." 6 The two
approaches can be summarized as follows. First, "the optimal con-
tracting approach ... assumes that it is possible to design a com-
pensation scheme that provides managers with incentives to
maximize shareholder value." 7 Essentially, the compensation
package is meant to align the interests of the executive with those
of the shareholders so that the benefit of one is the benefit of the
other. The theory is based on economics and suggests that an
optimal package can be achieved through negotiation and market
forces.6
The competing theory, "the managerial power approach, rec-
ognizes that compensation packages are designed through the
input of many individuals with different incentives." 9 One unique
aspect of this theory is the process of rent-seeking. 0 Rent-seeking
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id.
16. ICD Report, supra note 1, at 9.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 10 (stating that the reaction of market forces to optimal contracting
arrangements creates an efficient alignment of shareholder and executive interests).
19. Id.
20. See id. (stating that contracts may reflect rent-seeking as opposed to incentive
alignment).
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is "[tihe process by which an [executive] seeks to gain through
manipulation of the economic environment rather than through
trade and the production of added wealth. Rent seeking generally
implies the extraction of uncompensated value from another with-
out taking action which improve productivity."2' Essentially, the
managerial approach includes optimal contracting and manage-
ment manipulation.22 The managerial theory is present whenever
corporate executives directly influence the creation of compensa-
tion packages.
Ultimately, the use of negotiated contracts is present under
both theories. The use of compensation contracts to align execu-
tives with shareholder interests, however, is a double-edged
sword. Past publications have noted that "compensation contracts
provide incentives for executives to take shareholder-wealth-
increasing actions, [but] they also create incentives to misrepre-
sent the performance measures underlying the contracts by pro-
ducing fraudulent financial statement[s] or other information."
24
In order to mitigate the dangers of increased incentives in a com-
pensation contract, strong corporate governance mechanisms
should be established through applicable regulatory agencies.25
Consequently, the greater the incentives, the stronger corpo-
rate governance should be regulated.26 Adopting a flexible
approach that considers factors which could increase the incen-
tives of fraud will allow corporate entities to reach the optimal
level of corporate governance. A corporate governance scheme
should consider (1) the growth opportunities of the corporation; (2)
the amount of unrestricted equity-based compensation; (3)
whether the industry has a history of corporate fraud; (4) the limi-
tations on options and ability of corporate executives to sell stock
over the short term.21 Security regulators, both self-regulating
organizations and government agencies, should be cognizant of
the various factors that will affect the quantity and quality of cor-
porate frauds. This awareness will allow such regulators to
impose the optimal level of disclosure and transparency across the
various industries and markets.
21. Id. at n.35.
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id.
24. See Johnson et al., supra note 9, at 6 (stating that "strong governance
mechanisms could reduce the opportunity to commit fraud").
25. Id. at 27.
26. Id. at 32.
27. See id. (discussing the various factors impacting anti-fraud measures).
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The reason that government regulators need to regulate cor-
porate governance, albeit from a flexible business perspective, is
that market forces "are not sufficiently strong and fine-tuned to
assure optimal contracting outcomes."" The lack of executive tal-
ent and presence of frequent manipulation prevents the market
from operating at an efficient level.29 As a result, high-quality cor-
porate executives have tremendous influence on their compensa-
tion and they know it.3 In addition, markets are frequent victims
of manipulation by corporate insiders. Outside the market, direc-
tors are not always informed, strong or interested enough to curb
fraudulent or excessive executive compensation." As a result,
many compensation negotiations are ineffective at establishing a
solid regulatory framework.
Increased disclosure and transparency will bolster the share-
holder-regulatory impact of the "outrage effect." The outrage
effect refers to the reaction by non-executive to excessive or fraud-
ulent executive compensation.12 "The more outrage a compensa-
tion arrangement is expected to generate, the more reluctant
directors will be to approve the arrangement and the more hesi-
tant managers will be to propose it in the first instance."33 Ulti-
mately, an effective regulatory scheme will punish the directors
and not the shareholders. Further, an effective scheme will utilize
shareholders to keep corporate executives honest.
A. Current Compensation Levels in Canada
In 2005, compensation for Canadian Chief Executive Officers
(CEOs) surpassed the 2000 levels. 4 In 2000 the average compen-
sation package equaled $2.2 million, while the 2005 average
totaled $2.3 million.35 From 2001 to 2003 compensation levels
dropped, primarily because the amount of options granted
decreased.36
Executive compensation for non-CEOs, however, is a com-
28. ICD REPORT, supra note 1, at 10; Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried,
Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. Econ. Perspectives 3, 74 (2003).
29. ICD REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
30. Bebchuck & Fried, supra note 28, at 74.
31. See id. (noting that "[tihus, even a director who did not place much value on a
board seat would still have little personal motivation to fight the CEO and her friends
on the board on compensation matters").
32. Id. at 75.
33. Id.
34. lCD REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
35. Id. at 12.
36. Id. at 11.
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pletely different story. Between 2000 and 2002 compensation
levels remained relatively stable.' Although 2003 and 2004
revealed decreases in compensation, the 2005 levels are similar to
the 2000-2003 amounts. Interestingly, "the difference between
the compensation of the CEO and other named executives has
increased during the past five years."39 As the level of compensa-
tion for CEOs increases, so to does the level for non-CEOs, albeit
at a slower rate.4" Once again, the primary contributor to the
increasing gap is the increased use of options for CEOs, 41 which
may suggest a U.S. influence on executive compensation.
In general, the Canadian business culture has "a relatively
low level of pay for performance sensitivity" when compared with
the United States. As a result, the percentage of executive com-
pensation in the form of stock options is lower than the United
States.43 Despite the resistance to pay for performance compensa-
tion, studies have shown that companies "having more indepen-
dent directors leads to higher compensation levels."44 In addition,
Canadian cross-listed "companies have compensation levels that
are similar to their American counterparts versus non-cross-listed
companies." 4 All of this data suggests that as more and more
Canadian companies compete against U.S. companies, the com-
pensation levels between to two camps begin to converge.46 In
addition, it is likely that Canadian and U.S. companies compete in
the same corporate executive pool, which causes the two markets
to converge even more.
III. THE CANADIAN REGULATORY STRUCTURE
Unlike the United States and some European Countries, the
Canadian regulatory structure is comprised of several provincial
37. Id. at n.1.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 12.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 13.
42. Id. at 12.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 12-13.
45. Id. at 13.
46. In regards to Canadian-U.S. competition, it should be noted that over one-
third of all foreign companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges are Canadian. In fact, at
the end of 2006 Canadian companies equaled 491 of the 1,145 foreign companies
listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Israel and the United Kingdom, who make up the
second and third respectively, had a combined total of 145 listed companies.
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or regional regulators.47 "The majority of provinces have a two
tiered structure, consisting of an upper appointed commission,
and a lower level director and supporting staff."" Each regulator
enacts its own laws and rules,49 but their authority is limited to
their geographical boundaries." Ontario is the most influential
Canadian regulator and its legislation has served as a model for
other regulators.51 In fact, Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba,
and Saskatchewan have all modeled their legislation after Onta-
rio's laws." Newfoundland and Nova Scotia have also followed
Ontario, but to a lesser extent.53
The various provincial regulators have formed the Canadian
Securities Administrators (CSA), which "implement[s] policy
statements, and in most Canadian jurisdictions national instru-
ments to harmonize the filing and approval requirements with
regard to each of the separate jurisdictions . . ,,.4 In fact, there
are four primary objectives shared between the various
regulators:
(1) the registration of persons and institutions trading in
securities, and maintenance of the minimum standards
necessary to retain registration; (2) the registration of
securities distributed to the public by issuers; (3) the con-
tinuous and timely disclosure of relevant information to the
investing public; and (4) the provision of the necessary
investigative, preventative, and punitive mechanisms for
the proper enforcement of the legislation.5
47. 10B INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION § 32:1
(Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolf eds., 2007).
48. Id. (unlike the U.S. structure, the regional securities authority carries out the
same duties as "both the SEC and the blue sky state authorities").
49. The various securities legislation include: (1) Securities Act, (Northwest
Territories), (1988) (R.S.N.W.T.)(as amended); (2) Securities Act (Yukon Territories),
(2002) (R.S.Y.); (3) Securities Act, (Alberta), (2000) (R.S.A.) (as amended); (4)
Securities Act (British Columbia), (1996) (R.S.B.C.); (5) Securities Act, c. S50
(Manitoba), (C.C.S.M.); (6) Security Frauds Prevention Act, (New Brunswick), (1973)
(R.S.N.B.) (as amended); (7) Securities Act, 1990 (Newfoundland), (1990) (R.S.N.L.)
(as amended); (8) Securities Act, (Nova Scotia), (1989) (R.S.N.S.) (as amended); (9)
Securities Act, (Ontario), (1990) (R.S.O) (as amended); (10) Securities Act, (Quebec),
(R.S.Q.) (as amended); (11) Securities Act, 1988 (Saskatchewan), (1988) (S.S.) (as
amended); (12) Securities Act (Prince Edward Island), (1988) (R.S.P.E.I.); and (13)
Consolidation of Securities Act (Nunavut), (1988) (R.S.N.W.T.). See id. at 32:2 nn. 2-5.
50. Id. at § 32:2.
51. Id.
52. Id. (stating "[t]ogether the five provinces are known as the Uniform Act
Provinces").
53. Id.
54. Id. at § 32:1.
55. Id.
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In addition, the various regulators require four types of disclosure:
financial, timely, insider reporting, and proxy solicitation and
information circular requirements.56 Generally, publicly available
audited financial statements must be filed within 140 days of the
financial year.7
IV. CANADIAN REGULATION OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Following the SEC's lead, Canadian regulators made "their
first changes to executive compensation guidelines" in 1993.58
These guidelines, which continue to be Canada's current require-
ments for executive disclosure, were implemented in 1994.
Although Ontario's disclosure requirements were meant to mirror
the SEC requirements when they were promulgated in 1993, the
standards have since "evolved independently."" Both the U.S.
and Canada use mandatory disclosure as a means of discovering
abuses by corporate executives. 0
Ideally, the transparency created by mandatory disclosure
should notify shareholders of improper behavior by corporate
executives. 1 However, the increased complexity of executive com-
pensation packages results in today's investors receiving only por-
tions of an executive compensation package.2 Following the lead
of the SEC, on March 29, 2007 the Canadian Securities Adminis-
trators (CSA) proposed amendments to the form and instruments
of executive compensation requirements.
Like the United States, Canada uses tables to track the com-
position of executive pay.' The tables are combined with "charts
comparing the financial performance of the firm with similarly sit-
uated firms, and a textual explanation of the firm's compensation
56. Id. at § 32:22.
57. Id. at § 32:40.
58. ICD REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
59. Alarie, supra note 3, at 60 n.66.
60. Id. at 60. (stating that today "companies listed on the TSX [Toronto Securities
Exchange] are now subject to approximately the same level of mandatory disclosure
as are American public corporations").
61. Id.
62. Introduction, Proposed Repeal and Substitution of Executive Compensation
and Proposed Amendments to Continuous Disclosure Obligations, (Ont. Sec. Comm'n,




64. Edward M. Iacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation, 48
U. TORONTO L.J. 489, 497 (1998).
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policy."65 While mandatory disclosure promotes transparency, it
may also increase executive compensation because industry com-
petitors will have an available benchmark to apply to their corpo-
rate executives.66 Like many aspects in a market economy,
companies will compete with each other for high-quality execu-
tives. The result will be expanding compensation packages as cor-
porations attempt to lure highly-qualified individuals.
The push for regulatory reform is related to the U.S. Enron
and options backdating scandals.67 The use of options backdating
based on non-public information violates both U.S. and Canadian
securities laws.66 As a result of the U.S. scandal, it was expected
that Canadian regulators would follow the lead of the SEC to end
illegal options backdating.69 After the proposed amendments were
published, it was clear that Canada is determined to prevent a
similar scandal from breaking out in their respective markets.
V. OVERHAULING THE RULES OF EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION IN CANADA
Following the Enron scandal in the United States both the
U.S. and Canada began to scrutinize their corporate governance
laws.7" Given the strong economic ties between the U.S. and
Canada, such as the Multi-jurisdiction Disclosure System (MJDS),
it is no surprise that a major scandal in the U.S. would cause
Canada to overhaul its corporate governance laws.7 Corporate
scandal in the U.S., however, is not the sole reason for Canada's
recent overhaul.72 "Regulators in Canada want to protect inves-
tors and rebuild domestic and international confidence in
Canada's capital markets in light of Canada's own corporate scan-
dals . .. ."" Canada started its overhaul by creating laws similar
to measures in the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).74 Some of the
primary measures include "certifications of annual and quarterly
65. Id.
66. Alarie, supra note 3, at 60.
67. Andrew J. Beck, Under Scrutiny: Governance in Canada, (2004), available at
http://www.torys.com/publications/pdf/AR2004-8N.pdf; Torys, The U.S. Backdating
Scandal: What It Means for Canadian Issuers and Their Executives, http://www.torys.
com/publications/pdf/CM06-16T.pdf (Jul. 10, 2006).
68. TORYS, supra note 67.
69. Id.




74. Id. at 60.
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reports [similar to] SOX Section 302" and independent and quali-
fied auditing committees.75
The amendments are a reaction to a system which some regu-
lators claim is outdated and ineffective. 7 The CSA believes that
the proposed rules will "improve the quality and transparency of
executive compensation disclosure."77 The goal of the rules is to
require companies to disclose all compensation awarded to corpo-
rate executives in a new, clear and informative format.78 The CSA
anticipates that the new rules' disclosure requirements will allow
investors to make better assessments of a company and its
performance.79
The proposals reflect the SEC's recent executive compensa-
tion rules."s The amendments target five key areas: (1) The sum-
mary compensation tables will require a total compensation
column for every named executive officer (NEO); (2) a new com-
pensation discussion and analysis section (CD&A) explaining the
reasons for compensation programs; (3) a requirement that all
equity compensation reflect the company's financial statements;
(4) increased disclosure of potential termination payments for
NEOs; (5) a summary table and equity disclosure for directors
that are similar to NEO's disclosure.8'
Despite the similarities between the U.S. rules and the pro-
posed amendments, there is some divergence.82 Compared to SOX
requirements, the Canadian requirements pertaining to auditing
committees are significantly different. First, the committee does
not have to contain a financial expert, but the committee must
disclose "the education and experience of all committee members
75. Id.
76. Canadian Securities Regulators Propose New Rules for Executive
Compensation Disclosure, http://www.zsa.ca/zsa.php?fuseaction=main.featured-
articlesitem&id=537 (Apr. 10, 2007) [hereinafter Executive Compensation].
According to the CSA, a 2002 "study found that 95% of the companies disclosed
compensation information in boilerplate language or general terms." See 6.2.2 COST
BENEFIT ANALYSIS - EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE - AMENDMENTS TO NI 51-
102 CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS, available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/
Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_20070329_51-102_cost-ben-analysis.pdf
(last checked Jun. 26, 2007) [hereinafter AMENDMENT 6.2.21.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. AMENDMENT 6.2.2, supra note 76.
80. Executive Compensation, supra note 67; Beck, supra note 76, at 60.
81. Executive Compensation, supra note 76.
82. Id. (the new rules, however, would recognize disclosures made under the SEC
rules, so long as the company would not be considered a foreign private issuer under
those rules).
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.... M"1 Second, "[a]udit committees are not required to hire and
fire the independent auditors as they are under SOX, because
Canadian corporate law vests this power in the shareholders.",4
For the most part, the Canadian amendments are attempting to
reflect Canada's principle-based regulatory system, as opposed to
the U.S. rule-based system. 5 Proponents claim that the Canadian
amendments will be clearer and simpler than the U.S. version.86
If the amendments are passed, there would be "significant
changes in disclosure and compensation-setting practices in
Canada."87 Currently, the changes would begin in 2008 and apply
to proxy statements for the 2007 fiscal year.8 There are four high-
lights to the new rules. First, the summary compensation table
would reflect total compensation.8 9 Second, "[t]he 'named execu-
tive officers' (NEOs) would be determined by total compensation,
rather than just salary bonus."9° Third, more analysis regarding
compensation would be required.91 Finally, there will need to be
more disclosure about termination compensation.92
VI. ONE SIZE DOESN'T FIT ALL
A. European Union
The European Economic Community (EEC) is "the most
active and influential organization in the.., field of international
securities regulation."93 In addition, the European Union (EU)
83. Beck, supra note 67 at 60.
84. Id. ("Instead, the audit committee will make a recommendation to the board
about the auditor who will be proposed to the shareholders," but any rejection of the







91. Id. (The new analysis would require: "[D]iscussion and analysis of the
material factors underlying compensation policies and decisions reflected in the data
presented in the tables... [including] i) how the compensation levels for the period
might have been different under the various performance scenarios, and (ii) what
compensation levels for future periods might be expected under various performance
scenarios." Essentially, the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) would
reflect the heightened requirements of a Management Discussion and Analysis
(MD&A)).
92. Id. (under the new amendments any materials terms and data for various
termination scenarios would need to be provided).
93. 10C INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION § 50:1
(Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolf eds., 2007) (the EEC is the only
"multinational securities regime").
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has continuously pursued a system that promotes uniform safe-
guards and greater access to the various exchanges of the member
states.94 Since the adoption of the Sixth Directive in 1980, the EU
has established minimum principles for securities regulation in
Europe.95 These principles were based on "the International Dis-
closure Standards promulgated by the International Organization
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in 1998."96 For the most part,
however, EU directives are "soft" regulations that allow member
states to establish more specific regulatory regimes.
European Council Directive 2003/71/EC9 7 - "revised prospec-
tus directive" or RPD - allows issuers from member states to
"make an offering or apply for a listing on the basis of the same
prospectus throughout the European Union, without further
authorization for the host country regulator (the "single passport"
procedure98 )."99 In addition, the directive strengthens disclosure
requirements and clarifies the definition of qualified investors."0
Among the features of the new system are the follow-
ing: (1) the prospectus would be based upon IOSCO's Inter-
national Disclosure Standards (for purposes of the RPD, a
"prospectus" serves as both a prospectus for a public offer-
ing and listing particulars for a listing; these are essen-
tially one and the same document, though the disclosure
may vary somewhat based upon whether a public offering,
listing, or both are contemplated); (2) issuers would be enti-
tled to use a registration system similar to the U.S. shelf
registration; by virtues of this system, issuers would have
the possibility of effective an offering or a listing "on the
basis of a simple notification of the prospectus approved by
the home competent authority"; (3) the host state would
have diminished power to influence the disclosure docu-
94. 10 INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION § 1:41
(Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolf eds., 2007).
95. Id. (the Sixth Directive, which dealt with prospectuses, was adopted on March
17, 1980).
96. Bloomenthal & Wolf, supra note 93, § 50:1 (the directive, however, did not
adopt the IOSCO standards in their entirety).
97. Council Directive 2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 124) 64 (EC).
98. The single passport system allows "an investment services firm or professional
licensed in a particular European Union country to operate within the other EU
countries." Supra note 94, § 1:16.
99. AUTORITE DES MARCHES FINANCIERS, FRENCH REGULATION IN EUROPE'S
FUTURE FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE 6 (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.amf-france.org/
documents/general/6357_l.pdf [hereinafter AMF REPORT ON FRENCH REGULATION].
The European Central Bank endorsed the new directive, stating that it would simply
compliance and harmonize and enhance disclose standards.
100. Id.
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ment; (4) the disclosure documents (except a summary)
would not necessarily have to be translated into the lan-
guage of the host county; (5) the provisions governing rec-
ognition of prospectuses from issuers outside the EU would
be changed, potentially increasing the possibility for recog-
nition of prospectuses form outside the EU, provided they
are prepared in accordance with IOSCO standards; (6) issu-
ers will be entitled to use incorporation by reference; (7) the
prospectus must be publicly available in electronic form;
and (8) the existing Prospectus Directive and Listing Par-
ticulars Directive would be repealed. 1'
Some of the highlights of the prospectus directive include: harmo-
nization of prospectus content and approval times; stricter disclo-
sure requirements for listed companies; flexible procedures for
frequent issuers; electronic publication of prospectuses; and single
passport system.0 2 Another major component of the directive is
incorporation by reference, which allows references to previously
approved documents. 13
After the EU Parliament and Council adopted Directive 2003/
71/EC, the European Commission (EC) published Regulation No.
809/2004104 implementing the directive. The regulation acknowl-
edges the principles created in the prospectus directive and sup-
plemented the principles with practical rules. The regulation
established six requirements: (1) the format of prospectus; (2) the
minimum information requirements to be included in a prospec-
tus; (3) the method of publication; (4) the protocols according to
which information can be incorporated by reference in a prospec-
tus; (5) the publication methods of a prospectus; (6) the methods of
dissemination of advertisements. 5
In addition to prospectus disclosure, the EU has promoted
regional convergence of national corporate governance stan-
dards.0 6 On December 14, 2004 the EC recommended that mem-
ber states require regulated companies to disclose their policies on
executive compensation and prepare guidelines for disclosure and
101. Bloomenthal & Wolf, supra note 93, § 50:6.
102. AMF REPORT ON FRENCH REGULATION, supra note 99, at 17.
103. Id. at 18.
104. Commission Regulation 809/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 149) 1 (EC).
105. Id. at Art. 1.
106. AUTORITE DES MARCHES FINANCIERS, AMF 2006 REPORT ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNAL CONTROL 11 (Jan. 22, 2007), available at http://www.amf-
france.org/documents/general/7670 1.pdf [hereinafter AMF 2006 CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REPORT].
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shareholder control." ' In October, 2004, the EC began discussing
amendments to the 4th and 7th Directives. In particular, the EU
was proposing "to require companies to produce an annual report
on corporate governance and internal control systems, and to
increase transparency with respect to related parties' transactions
and the use of special purpose vehicles." °8 The proposal is
intended to increase disclosure and transparency in an effort to
prevent corporate fraud.0 9 In particular, the proposal had two
recommendations in regards to corporate governance. First,
"increase transparency of transaction involving related parties
and off-balance sheet liabilities "1....  Second, require "annual
corporate governance report[s] on all of the key elements in corpo-
rate governance structures and practices .... "I"
A year after the prospectus directive, the EU passed Directive
2004/109/EC - a "transparency directive" designed to supplement
the prospectus directive and other legislation."' The directive
addresses annual and interim reporting obligations for regulated
companies and establishes three primary reports; although home
Member States my tack on additional requirements."' The direc-
tive applies to companies listed on an exchange in any member
state, except issuers of only debt securities."4
The primary reports include annual, half-yearly, and quar-
terly statements. First, reporting companies must file their
annual financial report within four months of the end of the finan-
cial year."' Second, a half-year report must be published within
two months of the half year point."6 Finally, there is also a third
107. AMF REPORT ON FRENCH REGULATION, supra note 99, at 47.
108. Id. at 9.
109. Id. at 54.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 21.
113. Id. For member states the directive was required to become national law by
January 20, 2007. Bloomenthal & Wolf, supra note 47, § 50:7:30.
114. Bloomenthal & Wolf, supra note 47, § 50:7:30.
115. Id. "The annual financial reports are to include audited financial statements, a
"management report," and a type of certification by "persons responsible within the
issuer" to the effect that the financial statements give a real and fair view of the
financial position and results of the issuer and that the management report includes a
fair reviews of the businesses and position of the issuer, together with he principal
risks and uncertainties they face."
116. Id. The "half-yearly" report "must include a condensed set of financial
statements, an update of the management report, and like the annual report, a
certification made by persons responsible within the issuer." (internal quotations
omitted). Audit reports are required only if an audit has been conducted. In addition,
"[tihe interim management report must include at least an indication of material
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interim report that must be published between ten and twenty
weeks following the annual or half-year report.117 The directive
also mandates immediate disclosure of certain information,
including changes in shareholder rights and new issues."' All
reports must be filed in the home member state and the member
states are required to ensure that disclosed information is readily
available." 9
Currently, the EU is considering legislation that would create
a single system of financial disclosure and passport for European
securities. 2 ' The proposed system will apply to both debt and
equity securities.12' In addition to creating a single European
security market, the EU is also proposing to "harmonise periodic
and ongoing disclosure requirements for companies listed on regu-
lated markets as well as the notification obligations for major
shareholdings."122
B. France
In recent years France has actively reformed its securities
regulation.2 3 The reforms have made the French market more
competitive at the international level.124 Unlike the U.S., France
has "refined and, in some instances, relaxed [some regulations] ."12'
The Loi de Modernisation des Activites Financieres (Financial
Activities Modernization Act) merged "the Conseil des Bourses de
Valeurs (CBV), the French stock exchange authority, and Counseil
du Marche a Terme (CMT), the futures market authority," into the
Conseil des Marches Financiers (CMF)."2 6 Additional reforms
include the Loi de Securite Financiere (Financial Security Law) of
August 2003, the Ordonnance portent reforme du regime des
events that occurred during the period and their impact on the financial
statements... [and] principal risks for the remaining 6 months of the financial year."
117. Id. These reports are not "quarterly reports" in the traditional sense. Instead,
they are public statements that are made only if an "issuer has shares admitted to
trading on a regulated market ... " The statements must include 'an explanation of
material events transpiring during the relevant period, and a general description of
the financial position and performance of the issuer and its controlled undertakings
during the relevant period." (internal quotations omitted).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. AMF REPORT ON FRENCH REGULATION, supra note 99, at 6.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Bloomenthal & Wolf, supra note 47, § 1:15.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at § 1:17. The act was passed on July 2, 1996.
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valeurs mobilieres emises par les societes commerciales (Ordinance
on Securities issued by commercial corporations) of June 2004,
and the Reglement General de lAutorite des Marches Financiers
(General Regulation of the French Financial Market) which is pro-
duced by the Autorite Des Marches Financiers' (Financial Market
Authority or "AMF").127 Today, the AMF is the "new regulating
and supervising body of the French financial market."28
France's disclosure requirements are found in the Monetary
and Financial Code, the Commercial Code, and the AMF General
Regulation. 129 Under "Article L.621-18-3 of the Monetary and
Financial Code, listed companies are required to disclose informa-
tion relating to the matters stipulated in the last paragraphs of
Articles 225-37 and 225-68 of the Commercial Code, in accordance
with the requirements of the AMF General Regulation." 30 The
relevant articles of the Commercial Code require an annual
"chairman's report."
A chairman's report is required by all companies regardless of
their registration status.' Registered companies must comply
with Article 221-8 of the AMF General Regulation. 3 2 For compa-
nies that are not registered but are covered by Article L. 621-18-3
of the Monetary and Financial Code, the chairman's report must
provide information equivalent to registered company reports.133
Finally, if a company is not registered or covered by the Monetary
and Financial Code, then the report must be published in a sepa-
rate document that complies with Article 221-7 of the AMF Gen-
eral Regulation.' In addition to the chairman's report, Article L.
225-235 of the Commercial Code mandates publication of a statu-
tory auditors report commenting on the chairman's report and dis-
cussing "internal control procedures relating to the preparation
and processing of accounting and financial information."'35
France also has a law that requires periodic financial reports,
127. Bloomenthal & Wolf, supra note 47, §38:1.
128. Id. "The AMF was created by the Financial Security Act of August [1], 2003
[and merged] the Commission des Operations de Bourse (C.O.B.), the Conseil des
Marches Financiere (C.M.F.), and the Conseil de Discipline de la Gestion (C.D.G.F.)".
Id. at § 38:2.
129. AMF 2006 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 106, at 5.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 4.
132. Id. The regulation requires that a registered company must include the
reports and disclosure mentioned in Article 221-6 of the AMF General Regulation.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 5.
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whose requirements vary depending on the size and status (i.e.
public or private) of the company.'36 Unique rules apply for for-
eign companies listed on France's exchanges. The minimum
requirements, as mandated by the AMF, include: "(a) the date and
place of shareholders' meetings and (b) announcements regarding
declaration and payment of dividends, new share issuance, and
transaction involving the subscription attribution, withdrawal or
conversion of shares [and (c)] financial information accompanied
by a management report with translation. "137
Both annual and semi-annual reports must be published.
1 3
1
In addition, the AMF also requires that any material information
be published as soon as possible. 39 Companies are required to
update their information if plans or intentions change and the
effect will be material. 4 ° For purposes of unexpected material
events, disclosure is satisfied if the information is presented
"through a press release to a major news source" and a copy of the
press release is sent to the AMF before the information is
published.14
As a member state, France has complied with EU Directives
as reflected in their domestic commercial code. Articles L.225-
102-1 requires that all forms of executive compensation be dis-
closed in the company's annual report.' The "report must list the
names and individual amounts of compensation and benefits of all
kinds paid to each director and corporate officer during the year
by the company, the companies that it controls or that control
it."' Essentially, all methods of executive compensation, whether
fixed, variable, or exceptional, must be detailed in the report.'
The AMF has consistently held that compliance with corpo-
rate governance should be flexible. For instance, a report must
disclose any future "remuneration components," which may arise
under any change in circumstances.'45 Flexibility, however,
136. Bloomenthal & Wolfe, supra note 47, § 38.24.
137. Id. at § 38.26 (citing COB Reg. 88-04).
138. Id.
139. Id. at § 38:27.
140. Id.
141. Id. If the company maintains and internet site they are required to post the
information on their webpage.
142. AMF 2006 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 106, at 5.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. The AMF estimates that "one third of the companies do not disclose
severance benefits or supplementary retirement benefits for corporate officers." Id. at
128
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should not impair the clarity of the disclosure.'46 In addition,
methods of calculation must be included in every detail for all
forms of compensation, but there is no precise formula that must
be used.147 Prior to this requirement, it was estimated that most
companies disclosed compensation amounts, but not their calcula-
tion methods."4
In addition to substantive requirements, the AMF also
requires that communication between companies, the AMF, and
the general public be open and available. Under "Article L. 621-
18-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code, the AMF General Regu-
lation" requires that executive compensation reports be available
free of charge to the public and posted electronically. 4 9 For U.S.-
based companies, the AMF recommends that they provide infor-
mation regarding measures complying with the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. 5 ° Like U.S.-based companies, registered French companies
must disclose executive compensation. Unlike the U.S., however,
while most French companies separate the variable and fixed
components of compensation packages, most do not disclose the
evaluation method. 5'
C. Germany
Since the Treaty of Maastricht,' German securities markets
have been the bench mark of the European Union. 5 ' Because
Germany has the largest economy in the EU, "its capital markets
are playing a leading role" in the Union.' Germany's two pri-
mary security statutes are the Borsengesetz (Stock Exchange
Code) and Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation Act or the "AktG").55
Both statutes have undergone substantial revisions since the
1970s.'56 The Viertes Finanzmarketforderungsgesetz (BGBII) of
2002 is the most recent and expansive modification of Germany's
146. Id. at 25.
147. Id. at 5. The AMF encourages full disclosure of "exact fixed and variable
components of compensation . . .to avoid any ambiguity about executive pay and
benefits." Id. at 18.
148. Id. at 17.
149. Id. at 6.
150. Id. This is particularly true if the U.S. standards are different from French
requirements.
151. Id. at 17.
152. Treaty on European Union C 310/01, 2004 O.J. (EU).
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securities laws.157
Like Canada, Germany's securities markets are not controlled
by a centralized regulator.15 Each of Germany's eight stock
exchanges is independent and subject to local and federal regula-
tion. 59 Germany has a three-tier, fragmented system of securities
regulation.60 Tier one is the federal agency Bundesanstalt fur
Finanzedienstleistungsaufsicht (BAFin). T'' Tier two consists of the
regional securities regulators. 62 Finally, tier three is comprised of
various self-regulatory bodies, primarily "the eight German stock
exchanges."I63
The Stock Corporation Act, also known as the "AktG",
requires companies listed on a German stock exchange to publish
an annual report in the Bundesanzeiger (Federal Gazette).6 In
addition, Section 7 of the German Corporate Governance Code
outlines the corporate disclosure requirements.'65 Registered com-
panies must submit both annual and interim reports that comply
with recognized international standards and national regulations
under the German Commercial Code. 66 "The Consolidated Finan-
cial Statements shall be publicly accessible within 90 days of the
end of the financial year; interim reports shall be publicly accessi-
ble within 45 days of the end of the reporting period."'67 In order
to promote flexibility, the Code allows for deviations so long as
they are disclosed.
6 8
The aim of the Corporate Governance Code is to promote
transparency, clarity and investor trust.69 Following the EU
directives on corporate governance, Germany revised the Code on
June 12, 2006. All of the disclosure requirements must be
included in the compensation section of the Corporate Governance
157. Id.
158. Id. at § 43:3.
159. Bloomenthal & Wolf, supra note 94, § 1:14 (the eight stock exchanges are
located in Berlin, Bremen, Dusseldorf, Frankfort, Hamburg, Hannover, Munich, and
Stuttgart).




164. Id. at § 43:65.
165. GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 13 (Jun.
12, 2006), available at http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/E_Cor
Gov Endfassung June_2006.pdf [hereinafter GERMAN CG CODE].
166. Id.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 2.
169. Id. at 1.
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Report.' ° German companies must also disclose the variable and
fixed elements of compensation packages.
Some of the primary revisions deal with executive compensa-
tion including one section which requires "[t]he total compensa-
tion of management board members [including] the monetary
compensation elements, pension awards, other awards, especially
in the event of termination of activity, fringe benefits of all kinds
and benefits by third parties which were promised or granted in
the fiscal year with regard to management board work."' In
addition, all stock option plans, pension funds or liabilities, and
comparable schemes must be included in the report. '72 Finally,
severance packages and the nature of fringe benefits must be
disclosed.'73
D. Luxembourg
In Luxembourg, the Minister of Finance has significant
impact on the regulation of Luxembourg's securities market.'74
The minister is directly involved in the domestic bond market, has
enforcement authority of disclosure statements and appoints com-
missars "to the Luxembourg Stock Exchange (LSE) and to the
Institut Monetaire Luxembourgeois.""' Any enforcement action
taken by the minister, however, is reviewable by the Conseil
d'Etat, Comite du contentieux (Council of State).'76 In addition to
the Minister of Finance, the Institut Monetaire Luxembourgeois,
which was established on May 20, 1983, exercises regulatory
authority over certain areas of Luxembourg's securities market.'77
The Institut Monetaire has the authority to regulate the public
issuance of securities, including banks, investment funds and
securities depositories.'78 One of the institute's primary roles it to
supervise the disclosure statements of public companies.'79
In addition to government regulators, the Luxembourg Stock
Exchange has ten principles of corporate governance, with two of
170. Id. at 7.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 8.
174. Bloomenthal & Wolf, supra note 127, § 42:1.
175. Id.
176. Id. (citing Grand Ducal Regulation Annex 2 (Nov. 27, 1984)).
177. Id. at § 42:2 (The Institute replaced the Commisaire au controle des banques
and retained all of the commission's previous regulatory authority.).
178. Id.
179. Id.
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them addressing corporate disclosure. I0 Principle 1 addresses
corporate governance framework and Principle 9 addresses finan-
cial reporting, internal control and risk management.8 ' These
principles followed the EU's lead in creating flexible corporate
governance standards.182 In fact, "[t]he main objective of the Ten
Principles of Corporate Governance is to contribute to the creation
of long-term value."8 3 In addition, the Principles recognize that
transparency is a necessary element of external control.1 84 The
Principles promote transparency through the Corporate Govern-
ance Charter "and the Corporate Governance Chapter in the
annual report."
18 5
Principle 1, Corporate Governance Framework, requires com-
panies to "adopt a clear and transparent corporate governance
framework for which it will provide adequate disclosure."8 s Rec-
ommendation 1.7 requires annual reports to contain a Corporate
Governance Chapter and include specific items.187 A company
may deviate from the items, but they must explain their ratio-
nale.88 Principle 9 is more focused and addresses financial report-
ing, internal control and risk management.8 9 According to the
Principle, a company should "establish strict rules, designed to
protect the company's interest . "..."190 The Principle then estab-
lishes a list of recommendations pertaining to audit committee
action and other internal controls.' 9'
180. BOURSE DE LUXEMBOURG, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE TEN PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE LUXEMBOURG STOCK EXCHANGE (Apr. 2006),
available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/luxembourg-en.pdf (The ten
principles are (1) Corporate governance Framework, (2) Duties of the board, (3)
Composition of the board and the special committees, (4) Appointment of directors
and executive managers, (5) Conflicts of interest, (6) Evaluation of the performance of
the board, (7) Management structure, (8) Remuneration policy, (9) Financial
reporting, internal control and risk management, (10) Shareholders).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1.
183. Id. at 5.
184. Id. at 7.
185. Id. at 8 ("The Corporate Governance Chapter of the annual report should
include more factual information on the governance of the company, including any
changes that have been implemented, together with the relevant events that took
place during the last financial year, such as the appointment of new directors, the
appointment of committee members and the annual remuneration of members of the
board").
186. Id. at 13.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 25.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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Principle 8, Remuneration Policy, states "[tihe company will
secure the services of good quality directors and executive manag-
ers by means of a suitable remuneration policy that is compatible
with the long-term interests of the company."'92 The principle also
recommends that non-executive directors receive packages that
reflect their responsibilities and commitment, but suggests that
such directors not receive bonuses, long-term inventive or pen-
sions plans, or any performance based compensation.'9 3 The LSE
also suggests that boards establish transparent disclosure proce-
dures and recommends that any stock option awards be approved
in advance by shareholders resolution at an annual shareholder
meeting.' In addition, the LSE recommends that all discounted
stock options be disclosed and that all compensation awards be
included in the company's Corporate Governance Charter.9 '
Finally, the principle recommends that "[t]he total amount of
direct and indirect remuneration received by directors and execu-
tive managers by virtue of their position should be disclosed in the
annual report .. . [including] the fixed and the variable compo-
nents... [and] the number of options granted... and the condi-
tions of their exercise." '96
E. United Kingdom
Prior to 2000, U.K. stock markets were regulated by multiple
entities: (1) the FSA; the self-regulating organizations which con-
sist of (2) the Personal Investment Authority, (3) the Investment
Management Regulatory Organization, and (4) the Securities and
Futures Authority; (5) the Supervision and Surveillance Branch of
the Bank of England; (6) the Building Societies Commission; (7)
the Insurance Directorate of the Treasury; and (8) the Registry of
Friendly Societies. 17 The Financial Services and Markets Act of
2000 "replace[d] the fragmented structure of the financial service
regulation in the United Kingdom" by making the FSA king.'
Like many European countries, the U.K. adheres to principle-
based regulation. Under the Combined Code on Corporate Gov-
ernance, a company's main principle is to "present a balanced and
understandable assessment of the company's position and pros-
192. Id. at 23.




197. Bloomenthal & Wolf, supra note 94, § 1:41.
198. Id.
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pects."199 Under the Financial Services Act of 1986, listed compa-
nies must provide all information "that an investor and their
professional adviers [sic] would reasonably requires and expect for
the purpose of making an informed assessment."20 When a listed
company publishes its annual report, it must include a section
explaining how it applied the principles and whether or not it
complied with all sections of the Code.2"1 If a company does not
comply with all sections of the Code, it must list the sections that
were not followed and the rationale for not following them.0 2 In
addition, the code lists sixteen other requirements that must be
included in the annual report.2 3
On a final note, the Corporate Governance Code in the U.K. is
significantly smaller than the U.S. code. In fact, the U.K. code is
only fourteen pages long, as opposed to the U.S. version which
contains sixty-six pages excluding SEC rules.2 4 The difference in
complexity is due to a number of factors, primarily the conflict
between the U.S. rule-based system and the principle-based sys-
tem followed by most developed nations.
Like the Luxembourg principles, the main principle for the
level and make-up of remuneration states:
Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract,
retain and motivate directors of the quality required to run
the company successfully, but a company should avoid pay-
ing more than is necessary for this purpose. A significant
proportion of executive directors' remuneration should be
structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual
performance.2 5
The first main principle's support for performance based compen-
sation is based on the assumption that such awards will align the
directors' interest with those of the shareholder.20 6 In order to
maintain the alignment, the Code requires that stock options are
not discounted unless "permitted by the relevant provisions of the
199. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 14 (Jun. 2006), available at http://www.frc.org.ukldocuments/page
manager/frc/Combined%20code%2OJune%/202006.pdf [hereinafter U.K. COMBINED
CODE].
200. Bloomenthal & Wolf, supra note 94, § 1:40 (citing 1986 FSA § 146).
201. U.K. COMBINED CODE, supra note 199, at 23.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 23-24.
204. Bloomenthal & Wolf, supra note 94, § 1:98.
205. U.K. COMBINED CODE, supra note 199, at 11.
206. Id.
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Listing Rules."2 °7
Again, the U.K. Combined Code is similar to the Luxembourg
principles because both state that the "[1] evels of remuneration for
non-executive directors should reflect the time commitment and
responsibilities of the role."20 8 The Code also states that non-exec-
utive directors should not receive stock options unless shareholder
approval is obtained in advance.2 9 In addition, the Code suggests
that the options should be frozen for one year because holding the
stock suggests the non-director's independence.210
The second main principle of remuneration demands a trans-
parent procedure for developing and fixing executive compensa-
tion packages and clearly states that "[n]o director should be
involved in deciding his or her own remuneration."21" ' The code
provisions regarding the principle push for independence and dis-
closure in regards to the actions and decisions of the compensation
committee." 2
F. United States
Unlike Europe and Canada, the U.S. focuses on a rule-based
regulatory system. Under rule based systems, companies must
follow specific form requirements when disclosing executive com-
pensation. The result is a complex and formal system of disclo-
sure that attempts to micromanage compliance. While rule-based
systems are clearly defined and allow for more definitive compli-
ance, there are frequent grey areas that leave companies wonder-
ing whether they are within the rules. Often, companies seek No-
Action letters from the SEC in order to protect them from non-
compliance, or at least alleviate their concerns. Ultimately, the
lack of compliance flexibility makes the rule-based system less
efficient and perhaps less effective.
While the Securities Act of 1933 requires certain disclosures
to public offerings, the Security Exchange Act of 1934 "extends the
disclosure approach to the trading markets by requiring current
financial and other material information to be filed periodically by






212. Id. at 13.
213. Bloomenthal and Wolf, supra note 94, § 2:8 (citing Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970)).
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meant to provide investors with the information necessary to
make an informed decision. 14 Under the 1934 Exchange Act, com-
panies listed on U.S. exchanges must provide continuous reports,
"including an annual report on Form 10-K, a quarterly report on
Form 10-Q, and periodic reports depending upon the occurrence of
certain events on Form 8-K."21
Over the years, executive compensation in the U.S. has been
the target of increased pressure from shareholders and institu-
tional investors.216 Compensation packages are increasingly com-
plex, leaving shareholders progressively more suspicious."'
Generally, corporate executives try to design their compensation
packages in a way that would "minimize adverse shareholder
reaction and circumvent pressures form the investment commu-
nity."218 However, the impact of recent backdating scandals in the
U.S. created more than just adverse shareholder reaction; it forced
the SEC to enact "the most significant overhaul of benefit disclo-
sure policy since 1992. "219
In July 2006, the SEC revised its rules for executive compen-
sation. The purpose of the rule was "to make proxy and informa-
tion statements, reports and registration statements easier to
understand [and] provide investors with a clearer and more com-
plete picture of the compensation earned by a company's [execu-
tives] ."220 The new rule "affect[ed] disclosure in proxy statements,
annual reports and registration statements, as well as the current
reporting of compensation arrangements."22' On September 8,
2006, the SEC published its new rule regarding executive compen-
sation disclosure.222 The new rule contained a number of require-
ments including: (1) a single figure for total compensation for
every named executive; (2) a plain English requirement; (3) revi-
214. Id.
215. Id. at § 1:37.
216. John D. Shipman, The Future of Backdating Equity Options in the Wake of
SEC Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1194, 1194 (2007).




220. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 175,
53,158 (Sep. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 228, 229, et al) [hereinafter Final
Rule.]
221. SEC Press Release, SEC Votes to Adopt Changes to Disclosure Requirements
Concerning Executive Compensation and Related Matters (Jul. 26, 2006), http://sec.
gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm.
222. Final Rule, supra note 222, at 53.
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sions to tabular disclosure223 ; and (4) a new Compensation Discus-
sion and Analysis form.224
The new rule organizes executive compensation "into three
broad categories: compensation over the last three years; holdings
of outstanding equity-related interests received as compensation
that are the source of future gains; and retirement plans, deferred
compensation and other post-employment payments and bene-
fits."225 The disclosure will include a number of tables such as the
Summary Compensation Table 2 6 which categorizes: (1) dollar
value of all equity based awards; (2) amounts under non-equity
incentive plans; (3) changes in pension benefits and deferred com-
pensation packages; (4) aggregate amounts of all other compensa-
tion unless less than $10,000; and (5) total compensation.227
Additional tables include a Director Compensation Table, the
Outstanding Equity Awards at Fiscal-Year End Table,228 the
Option Exercises and Stock Vested Table,229 the Pension Benefits
Table, the Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Table, and "[a]
narrative description of any arrangement that provides for pay-
ments or benefits at, following, or in connection with" termination
or change of control.230
The rule will also address recent abuses in options backdat-
ing. Companies will now be required to disclose information
regarding options plans and practices.23' Specific disclosure
requirements include: [t]he grant date fair value; [t]he FAS 123R
grant date; [tithe closing market price on the grant date if it is
greater than the exercise price of the award; and [t]he date the
223. Id. "The amendments will refine the currently required tabular disclosure and
combine it with improved narrative disclosure to elicit clearer and more complete
disclosure of compensation of the principal executive officer, principal financial
officer, the three other highest paid executive officers and the directors."
224. Id. This form will disclose the principal policies and decisions behind executive
compensation program. The form will be filed with the SEC and available to the
public. There will also be a Compensation Committee Report which may be included
in the annual 10-K and proxy statement. Finally, the performance graph will be
moved from executive compensation disclosure to annual shareholder reports.
225. Id.
226. Id. This table is "the principal disclosure vehicle for executive compensation,
showing compensation for each named executive officer over the last three years." The
table will also include a Grants of Plan-Base Awards Table, which explains the
information contained in the summary table.
227. Id.
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compensation committee or full board of directors took action to
grant the award if that date is different than the grant date.
232
The company will also be required to answer numerous questions
in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis section.
2 33
After the rule was released, however, there was still consider-
able discussion about the completeness of the rule. As a result,
the SEC passed an amendment on December 22, 2006.2' The
amendment "align[ed] the reporting of equity awards in the Sum-
mary Compensation Table and the Director Compensation Table
to the amounts that are disclosed in the financial statements
under FAS 123R."2 31 The SEC stated that the amendment would
make disclosure easier and more understandable to investors.236
Essentially, the interim rule "add[s] a column showing, on a[ ]
grant-by-grant basis, the full grant date fair value of awards" to
the Grants of Plan-Based Awards Table (GPBA Table) which is
included in the Summary Compensation Table and Director Com-
pensation Table.237 In addition, the GPBA Table must disclose
information regarding a repricing or other material change to
executive stock options. 2 s The rule also conforms the timing of
the disclosure to FAS 123R.239
As the rule now stands, all stock and option awards must "be
reported in both the Summary Compensation Table and Director
Compensation Table in an amount equal to the dollar amount rec-
ognized for financial statement reporting purposes for such
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. For more information on the amendment see SEC Interim Final Rule
(December 22, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8765.pdf.
235. SEC Press Release, SEC Amends Executive Compensation Disclosure to More
Closely Align With FAS 123R (Dec. 22, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/
2006-219.htm. Financial Accounting Standards Share-Based Payment (FAS 123R)
deals with the "reporting of stock and option awards." Id.
236. Id.
237. Executive Compensation Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 250, 78,338 (Dec. 29, 2006).
The initial rule required "the full value of options and stock awards... to be included
in the Summary Compensation Table and Director Compensation Table in the year of
grant." Donald P. Carleen et al., SEC Amends New Executive Compensation
Disclosure Rules, Effective Immediately, 26 NO. 2 Banking & Fin. Srvs. Pol'y Rep. 1, 1
(2007). The rule ignored vesting and forfeiture conditions and award information. Id.
The interim rule replaced "the full grant date fair value, the includible value relating
to stock and options awards displaced in the Stock Awards and Options Awards
columns" with FAS 123R requirements. Id. This standard required the exact dollar
amount cost of the compensation to be recognized in the fiscal year. Id.
238. Id.
239. Carleen et al., supra note 237, at 1.
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awards for the fiscal year in accordance with FAS 123R."24 ° In
sum, the executive compensation rules are largely an overhaul of
equity awards, particularly options.241 Companies must now dis-
close both process and rationale for all stock option awards.242
Further, the disclosures must be "written in plain English so
every investor can understand [them]" and must be clearly
explained."
According to Shipman, however, "the new executive compen-
sation disclosure rule serves only as symbolic gesture, reinforcing
existing federal securities laws that already mandate the disclo-
sure of backdated options."244 "Prior to the new executive compen-
sation disclosure rules, the practice of issuing undisclosed
backdated option grants was illegal and violated federal securities
law."245 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20, 13a-
1, and 13a-11 all prohibited "misleading statements or omitting
material information in their public disclosures."246 Under these
provisions, the Department of Justice (DOJ) was prosecuting mis-
leading disclosure prior to the SEC's new rule.247 Ultimately, both
the SEC and DOJ were prosecuting misleading disclosures prior
to the new rules and the new rules do not appear to enhance any
of these provisions.248
The SEC, however, is not supposed to determine the best cor-
porate practices and enforce such determinations on publicly-
traded companies. Shipman correctly notes that "the SEC has
explicitly elected to remain neutral on the subject" of equity
options in executive compensation packages. 249 The SEC should
remain neutral and allow corporations to determine how their
240. Victor M. Rosenzweig, Quarterly Survey of SEC Rulemaking and Major
Appellate Decisions, 35 No. 1 SEC. REG. L. J. 5 (Spring 2007).
241. Id. at 1197.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1209 (quoting Chairman Cox and citing Ted Allen & Subodh Mishra,
Institutional S'holder Servs., An Investor Guide to the Stock Option Timing Scandal 1
(2006), available at http://www.issproxoy.com/pdf/OptionTiming.pdf) (internal
quotations omitted).
244. Id. Shipman suggests that the SEC is "[tiacitly accept[ing] the legitimacy of
these deceptive ... practices" and calls for a blanket prohibition against stock option
awards. Id. at 1197-98.
245. Id. at 1211 (citing M.P. Narayanan et al. The Economic Impact of Backdating
of Executive Stock Options, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1597, n.22 (2007)).
246. Id. at 1211-12.
247. See id. at 1213 (discussing the Justice Department's handling of options
backdating cases).
248. Id. at 1213-14.
249. Id. at 1200.
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compensation packages are structured. On the other hand, as
illustrated in the SEC's recent activity in the area of executive
compensation, the SEC should ensure that the decision a corpora-
tion makes is clearly presented to shareholders. The new rule
promulgated by the SEC is a clear outline of what is and is not
adequate disclosure.25 ° The rule provides companies with gui-
dance and shareholders with the ability to quickly and easily mon-
itor corporate disclosures.2"1
In addition, the SEC should be monitoring the corporations to
ensure that executive action is not manipulating markets or
defrauding investors. While this end may be obtained by regulat-
ing the actual composition of compensation packages, the same
result can be obtained by requiring clear, concise disclosure.
The only government body, if any, that should be deciding
such regulation is Congress because executive compensation is
influenced by corporate, tax, and securities law. Shipman cor-
rectly notes that the SEC has historically focused "on the disclo-
sure of information as opposed to substantive rulemaking."2 2
However, the intent and purposes of the SEC, the Securities Act,
and the Exchange Act has always been ensuring that investors
receive complete and accurate information so that they can make
an informed decision. The SEC was never meant to be a legisla-
ture of corporate business practices. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX), which calls for substantive regulation in certain areas, was
a mandate from Congress. The broad scope of SOX reflects the
Congress' legislative role, not the SEC's regulatory role. The new
SEC disclosure rules present an acceptable balance between cor-
porate disclosure and decision making and controlled government
regulation.
VII. CANADIAN RULES FOR A CANADIAN SYSTEM
Given the strong relationship and close proximity to the
United States, there is some pressure for Canada to adopt a simi-
lar system of securities regulation. There is, however, a funda-
250. In fact, comments by SEC Commissioner Atkins suggested that the illegality
of options backdating was, in part, related to the lack of clear guidelines in the area of
executive compensation disclosure. Id. at 1215.
251. Although the rule adopts a principle-based approach to corporate disclosure,
the terms of the rule provide specific provisions that must be satisfied or adequately
described. Such an approach is more definitive than the prior rules which merely
relied on misleading or inadequate disclosure.
252. Id. at 1219 (citing James Hamilton, Executive Compensation and Related-
Party Disclosure: SEC Rules and Explanation 79 (2006)).
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mental difference between the Canadian and U.S. systems. At its
core, the Canadian system is based on flexible principles that can
be adapted to meet the changing needs of Canada's business com-
munity. The U.S., on the other hand, has a complex rule-based
system that is often overly formal and inefficient. In addition to a
systemic foundational difference, proponents of the principle-
based system argue that "since Canadian public companies are
often less widely held and are smaller than U.S. companies (mak-
ing compliance costs relatively more significant), more flexibility
is appropriate."253 Proponents of the rule-based U.S. system argue
that their perspective is less lenient and prevents a conflict of
interest between private, self-regulating exchanges and inves-
tors.254 But a conflict of interest can be avoided by aligning inter-
ests, as opposed to requiring burdensome compliance.
Another reason that Canada should not try to mimic the U.S.
system is structure. The U.S. system is dominated by a strong
central regulator, the SEC. Canada, on the other hand, has a
regional structure where each province or territory regulates the
securities markets.255 While there is a push to create "a uniform
securities act" there is still internal resistance by the province of
British Columbia and others.2 56 Both British Columbia and Que-
bec are resistant to establishing a strong central regulator
because they fear that regional concerns will not be addressed and
the system will be dominated by Ontario. 57
A road that Canada should consider would be the path paved
by the European Union. Under the EU structure, a central regu-
lator creates "soft" laws that are primarily principle based. These
laws allow regional actors to slightly modify regulations to fit spe-
cific needs. A cooperative regulatory framework, similar to the
EU, would allow Canada to maintain a minimum level of uniform-
ity without completely sacrificing regional interests. In fact, the
foundation for such an organization has already been laid by the
CSA.
In regards to executive compensation, Canada should main-
tain its principle-based approach but with very clear requirements
and consequences. The principles of transparency and disclosure
should be central to Canadian corporate governance. The require-
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ments should include: (1) process disclosure; (2) a plain language
requirement; (3) and promotion of performance based compensa-
tion that includes limited shareholder involvement.
In the context of executive compensation, disclosure and
transparency should include the end result and the process.
2 8
Process disclosure allows shareholders and regulators to under-
stand changes in expected compensation packages.2 59 "Disclosure
of the process will further ensure that all involved will be diligent
in their efforts and accountable for the outcome."26° Ultimately,
the disclosure process allows shareholders to police the company
and creates a disincentive for executives to engage in manipula-
tive practices. Compensation committees will be forced to explain
not only their actions, but the rationale behind such actions. Fur-
ther, disclosure of process might lead to more uniformity through-
out the entire industry, which will allow the entire investor
community to check the abuse of executive authority.
Performance based compensation, while not fool-proof, is still
the most effective means of acquiring, retaining and motivating
corporate executives. Performance based compensation is only
effective, however, if the process is transparent. Requiring disclo-
sure of the process and rationale will help to prevent executive
abuse of performance based awards. Ultimately, a transparent
performance based package will align shareholder and executive
interests and allow both government regulators and shareholders
to oversee the compensation process. In addition, Canadian regu-
lators should encourage limited shareholder involvement perform-
ance base packages. Shareholders should be given the
opportunity to approve certain performance based awards, prima-
rily options. Allowing shareholders to approve options, especially
those that will be discounted or back-dated, will help to prevent
corporate fraud because shareholders will not want their shares
diluted or the company harmed by corporate scandal.
Canada's approach should balance principles with clear
guidelines. The guidelines should not be mandatory but expected,
unless there is a complete and clear rationale for deviation.
Because Canadian securities regulation has long been frag-
mented, Canada should consider establishing a nationwide organ-
ization that promulgates broad principles and guidelines. This
258. See ICD REPORT, supra note 1, at 41 (noting that disclosure needs to include
disclosure of process to be effective).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 42.
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approach would bring a minimum level of guaranteed uniformity,
but still allow for regional regulators to tailor regulation to local
needs. Finally, any action should be sensitive to the business
environment. Strict regulation of executive compensation should
be avoided because it will obstruct creativity and competitiveness
within the marketplace. In addition, regulators need to ensure
that deterrent mechanisms are punishing violators and not share-
holders. As a result, any civil penalties should be targeted at the
offender and not necessarily the company. Further, a balance of
strong civil and criminal penalties will be more effective than rely-
ing on moderate civil penalties and distant criminal sanctions.
Any concern regarding overzealous criminal sanctions could be
alleviated by developing a principle-based regulatory system that
allows for flexibility.
